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Abstract:  Attributions  of  omnipresence,  most  familiar  within  the  philosophy  of  religion,  typically  
take  the  omnipresence  of  an  entity  to  either  consist  in  that  entity’s  occupation  of  certain  regions  
or  be  dependent  upon  other  of  that  entity’s  attributes,  such  as  omnipotence  or  omniscience.  This  
paper  defends  an  alternative  conception  of  omnipresence  that  is  independent  of  other  purported  
divine  attributes  and  dispenses  with  occupation.  The  resulting  view  repurposes  the  metaphysics  
of  necessitism  and  permanentism,  taking  omnipresent  entities  to  be  those  entities  that  exist  at  all  
regions.  This  view  is  then  shown  to  best  accommodate  attributions  of  omnipresence  to  a  diverse  
range  of  metaphysical  posits,  like  abstract  entities,  and  a  more  diverse  class  of  religious  posits.   
  
1.  Introduction1  
Consider   the   claim   that   some   entity,   Ben,   is   omnipresent.   What   is   the   best   way   to  
understand   this   claim?   That   is,   if   we   want   to   adopt   an   account   of   omnipresence  
according   to  which   it   is  metaphysically   possible   that   some   entity   is   omnipresent,   and  
that   also   does   the   most   justice   (or   the   least   violence)   to   our   pre-­‐‑theoretic,   intuitive  
understanding   of   what   omnipresence   would   entail,   which   account   of   omnipresence  
ought  we  adopt?  
   The  philosophical   literature  on  omnipresence   is  vast,   though  largely  situated   in  
the   context   of   Western,   monotheistic   philosophy   of   religion.2   If   there   is   a   current  
paradigm   example   of   a   potentially   omnipresent   entity,   it   is   probably   that   of   the  
Abrahamic   God.   Our   approach   here   will   be   more   inclusive:   we   aim   to   consider  
omnipresence  as  a  property  that  might  be  had  by  entities  outside  of  the  scope  of  familiar  
Western   theistic   commitments,   such   as  numbers   and  other   abstract   entities,   as  well   as  
entities  like  Brahman  or  the  Dao.3  We  think  that  it  is  at  least  metaphysically  possible  for  
some   entity   or   entities   to   be   omnipresent,   and   we   aim   to   explore   the   nature   of  
omnipresence  as  such.  Our  goal,  then,  is  to  offer  an  account  of  omnipresence  deployable  
in   a   range  of   contexts—including,   but  not   limited   to,   standard  debates   in   the  Western  
philosophy  of  religion—without  being  conceptually  dependent  upon  notions  peculiar  to  
                                                            
1   Thanks   to   Bradley   Rettler,   Ben   Caplan,   Cruz   Davis,   Evan  Woods,   Kelly   Trogdon,   and   three  
anonymous  referees  for  helpful  comments  and  discussion.  The  authors  are  listed  in  alphabetical  
order.  
2  See,   inter   alia,  Anselm’s  Monologion   and  Proslogion   and  Aquinas’s  Summa  Theologica,   as  well  as  
contemporary   discussion   in   Hartshorne   (1941),   (Swinburne   1977),   Wierenga   (1988),   Leftow  
(1989),   Taliaferro   (1994),   Wainwright   (2010),   Press   (2013),   Stump   (2013,   2008),   Hudson   (2014,  
2009)  and  Inman  (forthcoming).  
3  The  omnipresence  of  numbers  or  abstract  entities  is  controversial.  On  one  leading  view,  abstract  
entities   are   distinguished   by   virtue   of   their   lack   of   location.  We   take   it,   however,   that,   if   one  
rejects   such  a  view,   the  best   remaining  alternative   is   to  hold  such  entities   to  be  everywhere.   In  
what   follows,   nothing   turns   on   endorsing   such   a   view,   but   we   take   it   that   an   account   of  
omnipresence   fares   better   by   virtue   of   accommodating   the   potential   omnipresence   of   certain  
abstract  entities  like  numbers.  
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any  of   those  particular  debates.  To  put   the  matter  another  way,  we  aim   to  provide  an  
account  of  omnipresence  that  makes  good  sense  of  the  following  kind  of  claim:  
  
(Omni):    Omnipresence  is  a  metaphysically  distinctive  feature  often  attributed  to    
religious  and  theological  posits  such  as  God,  Brahman,  and  the  Dao;  and  one  that    
might  be  attributable  to  certain  kinds  of  abstract  entities.4    
  
We   proceed   as   follows.   In   Section   Two,   we   introduce   two   more-­‐‑or-­‐‑less   standard  
accounts  of  omnipresence:   the  Occupation  View  and   the  Dependence  View.   In  Section  
Three,   we   introduce   a   novel   account   of   omnipresence,   which   we   call   the   Existential  
View.  In  Sections  Four  and  Five,  we  argue  that  the  Existential  View  should  be  preferred  
over   both   the   Occupation   and   Dependence   Views,   respectively.   In   Section   Six,   we  
consider   and   respond   to   some   objections   to   the   Existential   View.   Finally,   in   Section  
Seven,  we  offer  some  brief  concluding  remarks.  
  
2.  Occupation  Omnipresence  and  Dependent  Omnipresence  
One  family  of  views   interprets   issues  of  omnipresence  as   issues  of  occupation.  We  can  
group  these  views  together  to  get  what  we’ll  call  the  Occupation  View  of  omnipresence.  
On   the  Occupation  View,   the   claim   that   Ben   is   omnipresent   entails   that   Ben   occupies  
each  and  every  region.    
  
Occupation  View:  An  entity   is  omnipresent   if   and  only   if   it  occupies  each  and  
   every  region.  
  
While   this  claim  might  seem  straightforward,   it   leaves  open  a  wide  range  of  questions  
about   omnipresence.   Some   of   the   questions   raised   by   the   Occupation   View   concern  
occupation.  For  example,  what  is  the  pattern  of  occupation  that  unites  Ben  with  each  and  
every  region?  Does  Ben  occupy  each  and  every  region  by  being  wholly  located  at  each  
and  every  region  like  a  kind  of  Aristotelian  universal?5  Or,  in  contrast,  does  Ben  occupy  
each  and  every  region  by  exactly  occupying  the  sum  of  all  regions  and  thereby  having  a  
proper  part  at  each  sub-­‐‑region?    
Other  questions  raised  by  the  Occupation  View  concern  occupants.  For  example,  
if  Ben  is  an  immaterial  object,  can  Ben  occupy  regions  in  the  same  way  material  objects  
                                                            
4  Though  not  all  interpretations  of  Hinduism  take  Brahman  to  be  omnipresent,  certain  schools—
such  as  Vishishtadvaita  Vedanta—explicitly  do.  For  discussion,  see  Wainwright  2012.  Similarly,  
both   the   Daodejing   and   the   Zhuangzi   can   be   plausibly   interpreted   as   taking   the   Dao   to   be  
omnipresent,   with   the   former   stating   that   “Way   is   vast,   a   flood   /   so   utterly   vast   it’s   flowing  
everywhere”   (Chapter   34;   quotation   taken   from  Hinton   2013,   p.   69)   and   the   latter   stating   that  
“[t]here’s  no  place  it  doesn’t  exist”  (Chapter  22;  quotation  taken  from  Watson  2013,  p.  15).  




occupy   regions?   And,   if   Ben   is   a   necessary   being,   does   Ben   occupy   regions   in   other  
possible  worlds  in  the  same  way  as  in  the  actual  world?6  
Still  other  questions  about  the  Occupation  View  concern  the  regions  occupied  by  
an   omnipresent   entity.   For   example,   does   Ben   actually   occupy   spatial   and   temporal  
regions   or,   as   contemporary   physics   suggests,   spatiotemporal   regions?  Moreover,   are  
regions   self-­‐‑subsistent   entities   as   the   spacetime   substantivalist   suggests?   Or,   is   Ben  
somehow  identical  to  these  regions,  as  the  spacetime  supersubstantivalist  suggests?7  
As  recent  and  careful  discussions  of  versions  of  the  Occupation  View  offered  by  
Ross  Inman  (forthcoming)  and  Hud  Hudson  (2014)  demonstrate,  there  are  many  ways  of  
answering   these   questions   about   occupation,   occupants,   and   regions.   The   varying  
answers  deliver  importantly  different  versions  of  the  Occupation  View.  On  some  of  the  
possible  precisifications  of  the  Occupation  View,  the  existence  of  particular  omnipresent  
entities   turns   out   to   be   a   contingent  matter.   For   example,   if   there   is   a   possible  world  
consisting   of   a   very   small   spherical   region   of   spacetime   wholly   occupied   by   an   iron  
sphere,   some   versions   of   the   Occupation   View   will   count   that   iron   sphere   as  
omnipresent  at  that  world.  Similarly,  if  there  are  point-­‐‑sized  possible  worlds,  then  most  
versions   of   the   Occupation   View   will   hold   any   point-­‐‑sized   material   objects   to   be  
omnipresent   at   such   worlds.   For   defenders   of   the   Occupation   View,   the   question   of  
what,   if   any,   omnipresent   entities   could   exist,   turns   on   a   series   of   complications  
regarding   alien   entities,   the   nature   of   occupation,   and   the   variety   of   merely   possible  
spacetimes.    
Alternative   views   of   omnipresence   have  mostly   received   second   billing   to   the  
Occupation  View.  Perhaps  the  lone  exception  to  this  trend  is  the  family  of  views  that  fall  
under   the   umbrella   of   what   we   will   call   the   Dependence   View,   which   holds   that  
omnipresence  is  properly  understood,  not  in  terms  of  occupation,  but  as  derivative  upon  
other,  more   basic   attributes   such   as   omnipotence   or   omniscience.   In   turn,   these   basic  
attributes  ground  a  relation  other  than  occupation  which  holds  between  an  omnipresent  
entity  and  each  and  every  region.8  Thus,  we  arrive  at  the  following  characterization:  
  
Dependence  View:  An   entity   is   omnipresent   if   and  only   if   it   possesses   certain  
more   basic   properties   such   as   omnipotence   and   omniscience   that   allow   it   to  
interact  (in  some  relevantly  specified  way)  with  each  region.9    
                                                            
6  On  possible  views  of  occupation  and  location,  see  Donnelly  (2010),  Hudson  (2006),  Kleinschmidt  
(forthcoming),  McDaniel  (2007),  and  Parsons  (2007).  
7   On   the   ontology   of   spatial,   temporal,   and   spatiotemporal   regions,   see   Field   (1984),   Maudlin  
(1988),  Schaffer  (2009),  Sider  (2002),  and  Skow  (2005).  
8  One  can  read  Anselm  as  taking  omnipresence  to  depend  more  upon  omniscience,  and  Aquinas  
as   taking   omnipresence   to   depend   more   upon   omnipotence.   Other   accounts   might   take  
omnipotence  to  be  dependent  upon  both.  For  discussion,  see  Hudson  (2014,  pp.  136-­‐‑143),  as  well  
as  Hartshorne   (1941),  Swinburne   (1988),  Taliaferro   (1994),  and  Wierenga   (1988).  Nothing   in  our  
discussion  turns  on  this  debate,  however;  our  concern,  as  will  be  made  clear,   is  not  with  which  
attributes  omnipresence  depends  on,  but  with  characterizing  it  as  dependent  at  all.  




According  to   the  Dependence  View,  an  omnipotent  and  omniscient  entity,   like  God,   is  
omnipresent  only   in  a  derivative  sense.  On   familiar  versions  of   the  Dependence  View,  
the   omnipresent   entity   knows   what   is   occurring   at   all   regions   and   is   capable   of  
knowingly  exerting  its  will  at  each  of  those  regions.  On  versions  of  this  kind,  defenders  
of   the   Dependence   View   render   omnipresence   as   inseparable   from   the   purported  
attributes  which  are  the  basic  properties  that  allow  it  to  interact  with  regions.  (Here,  we  
focus   our   attention   on   such   standard   views,   leaving   aside   less   familiar   options   for  
developing   the   Dependence   View.)   Consequently,   the   fact   that   Ben   is   neither  
omnipotent  nor  omniscient  ensures  that  Ben  is  not  omnipresent.  
   We  take  it  that,  at  some  possible  worlds,  some  individuals  satisfy  the  criteria  set  
out  by  the  Occupation  View  and  the  Dependence  View.  Put  differently,  we  grant  that  at  
some  worlds,   entities  might   stand   in   exotic  patterns  of   occupation   to  various  kinds  of  
regions,  and  that,  at  some  worlds,  entities  might  be  able  to  consciously  exert  their  will  at  
all   regions.   As   we’ll   argue,   however,   neither   analysis   of   omnipresence   is   a   good  
candidate   for   understanding   the   ascription   of   omnipresence   in   claims   like   (Omni).  
Before  turning  to  this  argument,  we  begin  by  setting  out  a  new  account  of  omnipresence,  
which  we  call  the  Existential  View. 
 
3.  Existential  Omnipresence  
Quantifier-­‐‑domain   restriction   is   a   fact   of   life.   But,   in   the   business   of   metaphysics,  
unrestricted  questions,  asking  after  the  entirety  of  reality,  are  commonplace.10  When,  for  
example,   we   investigate   the   ontology   of   time,   we   can   ask   two   kinds   of   questions:   (i)  
temporally  restricted  ontological  questions,  which  ask  about  what  exists  at  a  given  time,  and  
(ii)  temporally  unrestricted  ontological  questions,  which  ask  about  what  exists  simpliciter.  So,  
while   some   views   about   temporal   ontology   might   provide   the   same   answer   to  
temporally   restricted   ontological   questions   about   the   present,   these   answers   are  
compatible   with   radically   different   answers   to   temporally   unrestricted   ontological  
questions:   some,   like   the  orthodox  presentist  will  deny,  while  others   like   the  orthodox  
eternalist  will  affirm,  the  existence  of  dinosaurs  and  moonbases.  
A  tacit  assumption  of  most  debates  about  the  ontology  of  time  is  that  the  correct  
answer   to   temporally   restricted  ontological  questions  varies   across   times.   It   seems,   for  
example,   that,   while   dinosaurs   once   existed,   they   no   longer   exist   and   that,   while  
moonbases  will  someday  exist,  they  do  not  exist  yet.  According  to  permanentists,  this  is  
a   mistake:   facts   about   what   exists   at   a   given   time   are   invariant.   This   is   because,  
according   to   the  permanentist   (at   least  of   the  A-­‐‑theoretic  variety),   it   is  always   the  case  
that  everything  always  exists.11  Moonbases  and  dinosaurs  presently  exist;  however,  they  
                                                            
10   Though  we  are   comfortable  with   completely  unrestricted  quantification,  not   everyone   is.   For  
more  on  this  topic,  see  the  various  discussions  in  Rayo  and  Uzquiano  (2007).  
11  We  assume  this  A-­‐‑theoretic  conception  throughout,  though  permanentists  are  free  to  abandon  
the   assumed  view  of   tense.   Similarly,  we   assume   that  permanentists   take   talk  of   “existing   at   a  
time”  at  face  value  and  so  do  not  analyze  it  away  in  terms  of,  say,  occupying  a  region  at  a  time.  




are  not  presently  concrete  entities.12  The  important  question,  for  the  permanentist,  is  not  
which   entities   exist  when,   but  which   entities   are   concrete  when:   dinosaurs   exist   now  but  
were  only  once  concrete,  and  moonbases  exist  now  but  will  only  someday  yet  to  come  
be  concrete.  For  the  permanentist,  the  nature  of  entities  changes  radically  over  time,  but  
the  stock  of  what  exists  is  a  fixed  matter.  In  this  way,  if  permanentism  is  true,  temporally  
restricted   ontological   questions   (when   not   reinterpreted   as   questions   about   what   is  
concrete)   and   temporally   unrestricted   ontological   questions   are   properly   answered   in  
the  very  same  way.  
Permanentism  is  a  striking  view  for  a  few  reasons,  but,  among  its  more  notable  
commitments   is   a   thesis   about   the   connection   between   existence   at   a   time   and  
occupation.13   A   natural   stance   about   temporal   ontology   is   the   following   principle  
regarding  existence  at  a  time  and  occupation:    
  
Temporal   At-­‐‑Occupation   (TAO):   x   exists   at   a   time   t   if   and   only   if   x   occupies  
some  region  at  t.    
  
The   intuition  behind  (TAO)   is   that   facts  about  what  exists  at  a   time  are  determined  by  
facts  about  what   things  occupy   the   regions   that  exist  at   that   time.  Since  permanentists  
hold  that  dinosaurs  and  moonbases  presently  exist  but  deny  that  these  objects  presently  
occupy  any  region,  permanentists  deny  (TAO).  According  to  permanentists,  facts  about  
the  occupation  of  regions  do  not  fix  facts  about  what  exists  at  a  time.  Instead,  facts  about  
what   exists   at   a   time  are   fundamental;   they   resist   explanation  or  analysis   in  any  more  
basic  terms.14    
Permanentism   has   a   modal   analogue   in   necessitism,   defended   in   Williamson  
(2002,  2010,  and  2013).   Intuitively,   facts  about  what   there   is   could  have  been  different.  
Some  things  that  actually  exist  could  have  failed  to  exist.  Conversely,  there  could  have  
been   some   things   that   do   not   actually   exist.   But,   despite   common   intuitions   to   the  
contrary,   necessitism   claims   that   the   domain   of   entities   is   modally   invariant.   In   the  
language  of  possible  worlds,  the  necessitist  holds  that  the  domain  of  quantification  does  
not  vary  from  world  to  world,  since,  at  any  given  world,  each  and  every  possible  entity  
exists.   According   to   the   necessitist,   Wittgenstein’s   twin   sons   are   only   contingently  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Linksy   and  Zalta   (1996)   takes   our   ordinary   talk   about   existence   at  worlds   to   be   systematically  
conflated  with  talk  about  being  concrete  at  a  world.  On  permanentism,  see  Williamson  (2013,  pp.  
24-­‐‑25).  Thanks  to  an  anonymous  referee  here  for  marking  the  distinction  between  A-­‐‑theoretic  and  
B-­‐‑theoretic  permanentisms.  
12  Of  course,  permanentists  of  a  certain  sort  might  want  to  deny  that  dinosaurs  presently  exist  but  
hold  that  the  entities  that  were  dinosaurs  do.  (The  same  goes  for  the  entities  that  moonbases  will  
be.)  This  particular  axis  of  variation  among  permanentist  options  won’t  matter  much  for  present  
purposes.  Thanks  here  to  an  anonymous  referee.  
13  For  ease  of  presentation,  we  assume  a  distinction  between  times  or  temporal  regions  and  spaces  
or  spatial  regions.  The  view  we  defend  here  requires  no  such  distinction.  
14  The  fact  that  occupation  facts  do  not  fix  existence  facts  does  not,  of  course,  entail  that  the  latter  
are  fundamental,  but,  for  our  purposes,  we  will  assume  that  such  facts  are  indeed  fundamental.  
Thanks  here  to  Bradley  Rettler.  
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concrete  entities.  At  the  actual  world,  they  are  non-­‐‑concrete,  but,  at  another  world,  they  
are  concrete.  But,  regardless  of  world,  these  entities  exist  in  some  state  or  other  and  the  
fact  that  these  entities  exist  at  a  world  is  fundamental.    
For  this  reason,  the  necessitist  rejects  the  modal  analogue  of  (TAO),  
  
Modal  At-­‐‑Occupation  (MAO):  x  exists  at  a  world  w  if  and  only  if  x  occupies    
some  region  at  w.15      
  
Within  the  permanentist  and  necessitist  frameworks,  entities  exist  at  times  and  worlds,  
but  not  by  virtue  of  occupying  parts  of  worlds  or  temporal  regions.  Rather,  the  fact  that  
an   entity   exists   at   a  world  or   time   is   fundamental   and   it   is   not   reducible   to   any  more  
basic  notion.  
The   Existential   View   of   omnipresence,   which   we   will   defend,   repurposes   the  
metaphysics  of  permanentism  and  necessitism  by  selectively  applying  its  commitments  
to  the  case  of  space  (or  spacetime).  We  start  by  rejecting  the  spatial  (or  spatiotemporal)  
analogue  of  (TAO)  and  (MAO):  
  
Spatial  At-­‐‑Occupation  (SAO):  x  exists  at  a  region  r  if  and  only  if  x  occupies  some    
(proper  or  improper)  subregion  of  r.      
  
Instead,   following   the   permanentist’s   treatment   of   existence   at   a   time   and   the  
necessitist’s   treatment   of   existence   at   a   world,   we   allow   entities   to   exist   at   a   region  
without  occupying  that  region.  Put  in  terms  of  existence  at  a  region,  we  can  characterize  
the  Existential  View  as  follows:  
  
Existential  View:  An  entity  x  is  omnipresent  if  and  only  if  for  any  region  r,  x  exists  
at  r.16     
  
According  to  this  view,  to  be  omnipresent  is  just  to  exist  at  every  region.  And,  just  as  the  
permanentist  takes  facts  about  existence  at  a  time  to  be  fundamental,  we  take  facts  about  
what  exists  at  a  region  to  be  fundamental.  Moreover,  following  Quine,  we  assume  that  
talk  about  what  exists  and  talk  about  what  there  is  are  interchangeable  and  that  both  are  
properly  regimented   in   terms  of  existential  quantification.  Correspondingly,   talk  about  
what  exists  at  a  region  is  equivalent  to  talk  about  what  there  is  at  that  region,  where  the  
things   there   are   at   a   region   are   just   those   things  within   the   domain   of   the   quantifier  
when  restricted  to  that  region.  The  things  that  exist  at   that  region  are  therefore  all  and  
only  those  things  that   there  are,  quantifying  restrictedly  over   that  region.  Accordingly,  
an  equivalent  formulation  of  the  Existential  View  is  as  follows:  an  entity  x  is  omnipresent  
                                                            
15   For   those   who   think   that   numbers   are   unlocated   yet   actual,   the   denial   of   (MAO)   will   be  
mandatory.  Other  views  might  attempt  to  distinguish  a  plurality  of  notions  of  entities  “existing  at  
a  world.”  For  discussion,  see  Lewis  (1986:  96).  
16  On  this  characterization,  omnipresent  entities  are  relevantly  analogous  to  necessary  entities  and  




if   and  only,   for  any   region   r,  x   is  within   the  domain  of   the  existential  quantifier  when  
restricted  to  r.     
   The  Existential  View  primarily  repurposes   the  machinery  that   the  permanentist  
and   necessitist   use   to   characterize   the   relationship   between   entities   and   times   and  
worlds,   respectively.   And   since   the   Existential   View   relies   upon   an   analogous   view  
about  the  relationship  between  entities  and  regions,  the  Existential  View  is  intelligible  if  
necessitism  and  permanentism  are.  Similarly,   the  proposed  analysis  of  what   it   is   to  be  
omnipresent   is   informative   and   analogous   to   analyses   of  what   it   is   to   be   necessary   or  
permanently  existing  that  necessitists  or  permanentists  might  themselves  offer.  
   The  Existential  View  requires  no  restrictions  on   the  kinds  of  entities   that  might  
be   omnipresent   and,   as   we’ll   see   in   the   next   section,   it   handily   avoids   awkward  
questions  about  occupation  and  regions  faced  by  the  Occupation  View.17  The  Existential  
View  also  delivers  a  suitably  full-­‐‑blooded  view  about  where  omnipresent  entities  exist.  
Suppose,  for  example,  that  Rm  is  the  maximal  spatial  region.  On  the  Existential  View,  an  
omnipresent   entity   exists   at   Rm   as   well   as   at   each   and   every   sub-­‐‑region   of   Rm.  
Omnipresence   therefore  differs   importantly   from  what  we  might   call  maximal  presence,  
which  involves  an  entity  existing  at  only  the  maximal  spatial  region  and  not  any  of  that  
maximal  spatial  region’s  sub-­‐‑regions.  
   Importantly,   the   Existential   View   does   not   require   the   full-­‐‑blown   spatial  
analogue  of  permanentism  or  necessitism,  according  to  which  facts  about  what  exists  at  
regions  are  invariant.  Such  a  view  would  entail,  among  other  things,  that  all  the  world’s  
active   volcanoes   exist—though   as  mere   non-­‐‑concrete   entities—at   your   house.   Instead,  
the   Existential   View   consists   of   two   primary   commitments:   (i)   the   rejection   of   (SAO),  
which   claims   that   facts   about   what   exists   at   a   region   are   fixed   by   facts   about   what  
occupies   that   region—in   contrast,   the  Existential  View  holds   that   omnipresent   entities  
exist  at  regions  even  without  occupying  those  regions;  (ii)  that  an  entity  is  omnipresent  if  
and  only  if  it  exists  at  each  and  every  region.    
   Beyond   positing   non-­‐‑concrete   active   volcanoes   at   your   house,   there   is   another  
reason  to  reject  the  full-­‐‑blown  spatial  analogue  of  permanentism  and  necessitism:  such  a  
view  would  make  all  entities  omnipresent,  thereby  negating  the  claim  that  omnipresence  
is  a  metaphysically  distinctive  property.  We  are  inclined  to  think  that,  in  saying  that  Ben  
is   omnipresent,   we   are   saying   something   truly   noteworthy   about   Ben,   rather   than  
something  trivially  true  of  all  entities.  We  therefore  reject  the  full-­‐‑blown  spatial  analogue  
of   permanentism   and   necessitism,   and   instead   adopt   the   more   conservative   view  
according   to   which   it   is   possible   that   some   entities   satisfy   the   criteria   set   out   by   the  
Existential  View.  The  truth  of  the  Existential  View  neither  stands  nor  falls  with  the  truth  
of   permanentism   and   necessitism—theses   we   ourselves   reject   as   implausible—but  
instead  depends  only  on  the  intelligibility  of  the  spatial  (or  spatiotemporal)  analogue  of  
some  of  their  adopted  machinery.  
                                                            
17   One   might,   however,   defend   various   restrictions.   For   example,   one   might   hold   that,   while  
existence   at   a   region   does   not   require   occupation,   an   entity   that   exactly   occupies   a   region   R  
therefore  exists  at  R.  Given  this  restriction,  any  entity  that  exactly  occupies  every  region  would,  




4.  The  Case  for  the  Existential  View  Over  the  Occupation  View  
Having  now  presented  the  Existential  View  and  the  Occupation  view,  we  consider  three  
lines  of  argument  for  preferring  the  former  over  the  latter.  
According  to  relationalists,  spatiotemporal  regions  depend  upon  (or  are  identical  
to)  relations  that  hold  among  objects.  If  there  were  no  objects  of  the  relevant  sort,  there  
would  be  no  spacetime  regions.  According  to  substantivalists,  spacetime  regions  do  not  
depend  for   their  existence  upon  objects.  Spatiotemporal  regions  can,   for  example,  exist  
without  any  objects.  Finally,  according  to  supersubstantivalists,  objects  depend  upon  (or  
are   identical   to)   spatiotemporal   regions.   On   such   a   view,   objects   of   the   relevant   sort  
cannot  exist  without  spacetime  regions.18      
While   familiar   lines  of  argument   for  and  against   these  views  appeal   to  a  priori  
considerations,   one   might   reasonably   treat   spacetime   regions   and   their   putative  
occupants   as   empirical  posits.  And,   like  other   empirical  posits,   such   entities  would  be  
plausibly  counted  as  contingent.  Given  the  contingency  of  the  relevant  entities,  a  natural  
conclusion   is   that   relationalism,   substantivalism,  and   supersubstantivalism,   if   true,   are  
only  contingently  true.    
For  each  of  these  views,  the  corresponding  ways  in  which  the  Occupation  View  
accommodates  omnipresence  will  differ  significantly.  While  the  substantivalist  posits  a  
fundamental   relation  of   occupation   that   holds   between   an  omnipresent   entity   and   the  
regions  it  occupies,  the  supersubstantivalist  requires  something  like  the  constitution  of,  
or  identity  between,  that  entity  and  spacetime.  In  addition,  the  relationalist  must  explain  
omnipresence   in   terms   of   the   relations   between   the   omnipresent   entity   and   other  
entities.   It   looks,   then,   like   the   Occupation   View   of   omnipresence   is   either   (i)   highly  
disjunctive,  holding  that  omnipresence  consists  in  an  entity  possessing  one  of  very  many  
quite   different   kinds   of   spatiotemporal   properties   in   certain   kinds   of   worlds;   or   (ii)  
tethered   to  a  contentious  view  about   the  necessary   truth  of  empirical  claims  regarding  
the   nature   of   spacetime.   Moreover,   since   the   varieties   of   substantivalism,  
supersubstantivalism,   and   relationalism   proliferate   quickly,   we   think   that   this  
disjunctive   version   of   omnipresence   turns   out   to   be   highly   disjunctive—that   is that  
ascriptions   of   omnipresence   end   up   involving   a   highly   complex   property   of   being  
related   to   some   kinds   of   regions   in   a   certain  way   in   some  worlds   or   being   related   to  
perhaps   other   kinds   of   regions   in   a  different  way   in   other  worlds,   and   so   on.   Indeed,  
such   a   view   is   expressible   only   by   fixing   upon   the   space   of   possible   views   about   the  
nature  of  spatiotemporal  regions,  objects,  and  their  relations.  Since  we  think  it  is  a  vice  
of  theories  to  be  highly  disjunctive  in  this  way  and,  since  we  see  no  offsetting  virtues,  we  
have  grounds  to  prefer  the  Existential  View  to  the  Occupation  View.19  
                                                            
18  Here,  we’re  running  together  certain  variants  of  substantivalism  and  supersubstantivalism  that  
differ  not  only  about  whether  the  notion  of  dependence  figures  into  their  proper  formulation  but  
also  over  whether  the  relation  between  objects  and  regions  is  one  of  identity  or  something  more  
like  constitution.  
19   Those   who   accept   (i)   that   God   is   omnipresent,   and   (ii)   that   omnipresence   is   one   of   God’s  




A   second   line   of   argument   for   preferring   the   Existential   View   issues   from   the  
neutrality   it  preserves  regarding  principles  about  occupation.  Recall,   for  example,   that,  
on   some   versions   of   the   Occupation   View,   omnipresence   requires   that   an   object   be  
wholly   located   at   the  maximal   spatiotemporal   region,   but   not   wholly   located   at   each  
sub-­‐‑region.   In   contrast,   other   versions   of   the   Occupation   View   hold   an   omnipresent  
entity  to  be  wholly  present  at  each  and  every  region  much  like  an  Aristotelian  universal.  
We  agree  that  the  latter  version  of  the  Occupation  View  better  accommodates  intuitive  
notions   of   omnipresence.   After   all,   the   former   view,   along   with   some   auxiliary  
mereological   assumptions  guarantees,   that,  necessarily,   there   is   an  omnipresent   entity:  
the   universe.   Since   omnipresence   is,   as   discussed   in   the   previous   section,   a   more  
interesting  metaphysical   feature—at   least   in   the   sense   that   the   existence   of   any   actual  
omnipresent   entities   should   at   least   be   taken   as   controversial—we   think   that   latter  
account   is  preferable   to   the   former.  At   the  same  time,  we’re  uncertain  whether  entities  
can   exhibit   the   pattern   of   location   typically   ascribed   to   Aristotelian   universals.   For  
example,   a   plausible   view   about   the   occupation   and  mereological   structure   of   objects  
takes  any  object  that  occupies  distinct  regions  to  have  parts  at  those  regions.  But,  if  that’s  
right,  the  best  version  of  the  Occupation  View  requires  highly  contentious  commitments  
about   occupation   and  mereology.  We   also   hold   that   it’s   implausible   to   think   that   the  
pure   sets   exhibit   this   pattern   of   occupation,  which  would   too   easily   rule   out   the   very  
possibility   that   mathematical   entities   are   omnipresent.   For   this   reason,   we   think   the  
Existential  View  enjoys  virtuous  neutrality  regarding  these  questions  of  occupation  and  
location  and  is  therefore  preferable  to  the  Occupation  View.  
A  third  line  of  argument  for  the  Existential  View  over  the  Occupation  View  turns  
on  the  connection  between  occupation  or  spatial   location  and  the  notion  of  material  or  
physical   entity.   On   some   views   of   the   distinction   between   material   and   immaterial  
entities,  if  an  entity  occupies  a  spatial  region,  it  is  properly  counted  as  a  material  entity.20  
It  looks,  then,  like  the  Occupation  View  entails  that  any  omnipresent  entity  is  thereby  a  
material  entity,  once  granted  the  assumption  that  occupying  a  spatial  region  suffices  for  
being  material.   This   seems   the  wrong   result   in   the   case   of   pure  mathematical   entities,  
and  probably  also   in   the  case  of  God.21  And,  while  one  might   take   this  as  grounds   for  
tinkering   with   extant   accounts   of   what   it   means   to   be   a   material   entity,   or   for  
introducing  an  occupation  relation  defined  on  both  material  and  immaterial  entities,  an  
alternative  response  is  to  hold  that  a  suitable  account  of  omnipresence  should  make  the  
matter   of   omnipresence   orthogonal   to   the   material-­‐‑immaterial   distinction.   Since   the  
Existential   View   avoids   any   commitment   to   claims   about   occupation,   it   preserves   the  
coherence   of   views   on   which   physical   or   material   entities   are   distinguished   by   their  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
so  highly  disjunctive  and  expressible  only  by  fixing  upon  the  space  of  possible  views  about  the  
nature  of  spatiotemporal  regions,  objects,  and  their  relations.  Those  who  accept  (i)  and  (ii),  then,  
have  all  the  more  reason  to  be  wary  of  the  Occupation  View.  
20  On  materiality  and  occupation,  see  Markosian  (2000).  
20   Hudson   (2014,   pp.   152-­‐‑153)   struggles   with   this   problem,   which   he   calls   the   problem   of  
incorporeality:  “how  can  something  occupy  a  region  and  fail  to  have  a  body?”  
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occupation   of   spatial   regions   but   where   non-­‐‑physical   or   immaterial   entities   like  
mathematical  entities  or  God  are  nevertheless  omnipresent.22    
  
5.  The  Case  for  the  Existential  View  over  the  Dependence  View  
We’ve  seen  reason   to  prefer   the  Existential  View  to   the  Occupation  View.  None  of   the  
lines   of   argument   examined   in   the   previous   section,   however,   tell   against   the  
Dependence  View.  Again,  on  such  a  view,  an  omnipresent  entity  is  truly  omnipresent  in  
only   a   derivative   sense:   it   is   first   omniscient   and   omnipotent,   and   hence   aware   of   all  
goings-­‐‑on   and   able   to   consciously   exert   its   will   in   all   regions.   Putting   aside   difficult  
questions  about  what  it  is  to  be  aware  at  a  region  and  what  it  is  to  exert  will  in  a  region,  it  is  
plausible  to  suppose  that  the  friend  of  the  Dependence  View  can  adequately  characterize  
her  view  in  a  manner  separable  from  what  the  actual  ontology  of  spacetime  and  regions  
turns  out  to  be.  Since  the  view  doesn’t  trade  in  the  notion  of  occupation  at  all,  it  is  also  
neutral   with   respect   to   the   occupation   relation,   as   well   as   questions   of   what   kind   of  
entities  can  occupy  what  kind  of  regions.  The  friend  of  the  Dependence  View,  then,  can  
avail  herself  of  all  of  the  lines  of  argument  we’ve  offered  so  far  in  favor  of  the  Existential  
View   over   the  Occupation  View,   to  make   a   plausible   case   for,   not   just   the   Existential  
View,  but  the  Dependence  View  as  well.  
While  we  think  that  this  is  all  correct,  there  is  at  least  one  strong  argument  for  the  
claim   that   the   Existential   View   should   be   preferred   to   the   Dependence   View:   the  
Existential  View  allows  us  to  characterize  the  aforementioned  mathematical  entities,  as  
well   as   other   potential   posits   such   as   the   Dao,   as   omnipresent,   and   the   Dependence  
View  does  not.  This  is  an  instance  of  a  more  general  problem  faced  by  the  Dependence  
View:  since  it  takes  omnipresence  to  be  derivative  of  omnipotence  and  omnipresence,  it  
presupposes  that  only  agents—specifically,  willful  agents  possessing  awareness—could  
be   omnipresent.   We   take   this   to   be   an   unnecessary   restriction   imposed   by   the  
Dependence   View,   with   the   view   tacitly   assuming   a   particular   religious   framework  
when   trying   to   adjudicate   issues   of   a   property   that   is   certainly   not   unique   to   that  
framework,  as  demonstrated  by  prima  facie  sensible  sentences  such  as  (Omni).  
We   take   it   to   be   a   virtue   of   the   Existential   View   that   it   avoids   any   such  
restrictions,   and   does   not   tie   our   understanding   of   omnipotence   too   closely   to   any  
particular   religious   framework.  Even   if  we  doubt   that  mathematical   entities  or  entities  
such  as  the  Dao  are  omnipresent,  as  long  as  we  think  that  it  is  not  a  category  mistake  to  
ask  if  they  are,  we  have  reason  to  prefer  the  Existential  View.  
  
6.  Objections  to  the  Existential  View  
                                                            
22  See,  inter  alia,  Hudson  (2014)  and  Inman  (forthcoming).  Note  that,  on  Hudson’s  (2014,  pp.  151-­‐‑
153)   account,   some   puzzles   remain:   the   problem   of   timelessness   (“how   can   something   occupy   a  
region   and   be   atemporal?”)   and   the   problem   of   co-­‐‑location   (“how   can   two   numerically   distinct  
things   each   occupy   the   same   region?”).   By   eschewing   talk   of   occupation,   the   Existential   View  




We’ve   defended   a   novel   framework   for   making   sense   of   claims   about   omnipresent  
entities,  and  argued  that  that  framework  is  preferable  to  other  extant  frameworks.  We’ll  
now  consider  some  arguments  against  this  account  of  omnipresence.    
Objection  One:  Claims  about  omnipresence  are  claims  about  “presence,”  and,  for  
this  reason,  inseparable  from  claims  about  regions  and  occupation.  Since  the  Existential  
View   focuses   only   on   existence   at   a   region   but   does   not   involve   the   occupation   of  
regions,  it  is  not  a  tenable  way  of  interpreting  claims  about  omnipresence.23    
Response:   This   objection   alleges   that   the   Existential   View   changes   the   subject,  
implausibly  recasting  talk  about  location  in  terms  of  talk  about  existence  at  regions.  We  
think   this   objection   proceeds   from   dialectically   unstable   terrain.   First,   familiar   claims  
about   God’s   omnipresence   are   commonly   packaged   with   apparently   contradictory  
assertions  about  God’s  lack  of  any  presence  whatsoever—see,  for  example,  Anselm,  who  
has  stated  that  “the  Supreme  Being  exists  in  every  place  and  at  all  times”  but  also  “exists  
in  no  place  and  at  no   time.”   In   this  respect,  we  think  that   there   is  no  especially  robust  
body  of  discourse  that  an  account  of  omnipresence  is  duty-­‐‑bound  to  square  with.24    
Additionally,   we   think   that,   even   if   we   do   take   common   discourse   about  
omnipresence   seriously,   there’s   evidence   that   the   Existential   View   is   a   viable  
interpretation   of   claims   about   omnipresence.   We   think,   for   example,   that   the   best  
rendering  of  apparently  contradictory  Anselm-­‐‑style  claims  is  that,  in  asserting  that  God  
is  nowhere,  one  can  reasonably  assert  that  God  lacks  any  location,  but  that,  in  asserting  
that   God   is   everywhere,   one   can   reasonably   assert   that   God   nevertheless   exists   at   all  
regions.  Moreover,  we  think  that  this  kind  of  mystery-­‐‑mongering  isn’t  well  captured  by  
location-­‐‑driven   views   of   omnipresence   such   as   the   Occupation   View.   After   all,   if  
omnipresence  was  about  location,  the  only  way  to  make  sense  of  Anselm-­‐‑style  remarks  
is   that   speakers  are  using   location   talk  ambiguously  and   intend  a  highly   sophisticated  
reading   of   location   claims   in   one   context   and   a   different   highly   sophisticated   reading  
other   contexts.   We   think   it’s   more   plausible   that   speakers   intend   a   fairly   rough  
conception   of   location   in   contexts   where   they   deny   God   is   in   any   place   and   a   fairly  
intuitive   notion   of   existence   in   other   contexts.   Put   differently:  we   think   that,   once  we  
take   the  Existential  View  seriously,   it  provides   the  best  way  to  make  sense  of  Anselm-­‐‑
style   claims.   Our   response   to   this   objection   is,   then,   that   we   don’t   think   extant  
discussions  of  omnipresence  are  well-­‐‑regimented  enough  to  require  fidelity,  but,  even  if  
we  did,  we  think  the  Existential  View  does  better  than  the  Occupation  View  in  making  
sense  of  their  most  notable  feature:  Anselmian  doubletalk.25    
                                                            
23  This  objection  applies  to  the  Dependence  View  as  well,  since  it  takes  God’s  omnipresence  to  be  
a  matter  of  God’s  distinctive  capacities  rather  than  a  claim  about  which  regions  God  occupies.  
24  For  more  discussion  of  this  topic,  see  Hudson  (2014,  pp.  137-­‐‑138),  as  well  as,  inter  alia,  Wierenga  
(1988),  Leftow  (1989),  and  Inman  (forthcoming).  
25  The  Dependence  View  can  also  naturally  account   for   such  an  ambiguity,   taking  some   talk  of  




Objection  Two:  The  denial  of  (TAO)/(MAO)/(SAO)  is  incoherent.  No  sense  can  be  
made  of   the   idea   that   something  exists   at   a   time/world/region  without  occupying   that  
region.    
Response:   We’re   wary   of   claims   of   incoherence,   but   we   grant   that   some  
philosophers  might   reasonably   stick   to   (TAO),   (MAO),   or   (SAO).  We   think,   however,  
that  many   folks   are   already   committed   to   rejecting   one   or   all   of   these   theses   in   some  
form   or   other.   Consider,   for   example,   the   platonist   who   denies   the   omnipresence   of  
numbers   and   other   abstract   entities.   This   platonist   likely   holds   that   numbers   are   not  
located  anywhere,  but,  even  so,  she  will  maintain  that  numbers  exist  at  the  actual  world  
and   every   other   world   besides.   In   this   way,   she   picks   and   chooses   among   (TAO),  
(MAO),  and  (SAO)  in  a  way  at  odds  with  accepting  the  core  notion  of  at-­‐‑occupation  that  
figures  in  each  of  them,  since  she  accepts  it  only  for  times  or  regions  but  not  for  worlds.  
We   think  her  stance   is  unprincipled  but  entirely  coherent.   In  similar   fashion,  we   think  
that,  in  denying  (SAO),  our  stance  is  principled  and  entirely  coherent.  
  
7.  Conclusion  
We  think  that  omnipresent  entities  are  metaphysically  possible,  and  that  omnipresence  
is   a  metaphysically   distinctive   and   interesting   property.   In   addition   to   the   commonly  
posited   omnipotent,   omniscient,   omnipresent,   agential   God,   we   take   it   that   there   are  
other  metaphysically  possible  entities  of  philosophical,   theological,  or  religious  interest  
that  might  plausibly   lack   some   combination  of  omnipotence,   omniscience,   and  agency  
but  are  nonetheless  potentially  omnipresent.  
We’ve   compared   three   competing   accounts   of   omnipresence:   the   Occupation  
View,   the  Dependence  View,   and   the  Existential  View.  Whereas   the  Occupation  View  
allows  us   to  capture  some  of   the  above  claims  and   the  Dependence  View  allows  us   to  
capture  others,  neither  allows  us  to  capture  them  all.  The  Existential  View,  on  the  other  
hand,   does.   Furthermore,   none   of   the   objections   lodged   against   the   Existential   View  
have   stood   up   to   scrutiny.   We   conclude   that   the   Existential   View   provides   the   best  
account  of  omnipresence.  
If  we'ʹre  right,  omnipresent  entities  exist  everywhere  even  though  they  might  not  
occupy  all   (or   even  any)   regions.  At   the   same   time,   in  uncoupling  omnipresence   from  
matters   of   occupation   and  dependence,  we  have  not   attempted   to   reductively   analyze  
omnipresence   in   non-­‐‑existential   terms.   On   the   contrary,   the   proposed   account   of  
omnipresence  is  couched  solely  in  terms  of  what  exists  at  what  regions.  This  leaves  open  
whether  the  notion  of  existing  at  a  region  itself  admits  of  further  analysis,  but,  regardless  
of   whether   it   is   a   (non-­‐‑)primitive   notion,   it   offers   an   apt   and   informative   account   of  
omnipresence.  
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